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Abstract  
 Based on evidences from empirical disciplines, the paper offers three different basic assumptions 
and one simplified framework on individual behavior when dealing with signals from uncertain 
environments. On the basis of these, the paper defines individual knowledge and shows its 
hierarchical state, the connatural- and the acquired-shared-knowledge among individuals. 
Furthermore, the paper describes and explains the sources and general mechanisms of changing of 
these kinds of knowledge, and stresses that human connatural knowledge is the most stable level 
in the entire knowledge, which constitutes the fundamental prerequisite for mutually recognizing 
signals (or events) and interactions among individuals; The acquired-shared-knowledge, however, 
is the common anticipation owned among individuals about behavioral response of other 
individuals facing a signal; it derives from interacting experiences between individuals and 
circumstances or among individuals; and stable accumulation of the knowledge is one of key 
foundations on which the stable anticipation of individual behavior, commonly behavioral beliefs 
and rules will can be formed in a group. 
Key Words: individual assumptions, simplified behavior-framework, individual knowledge, 
knowledge hierarchy, shared knowledge, common behavior rules, empirical evidences 
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1. Introduction 
 What behavioral and knowledge state do human beings possess through the long history of 
natural evolution? How do they obtain knowledge and change their behaviors in a truly uncertain 
environment? How are common behavioral rules, such as conventions or customs, formed and 
changed within human groups? These questions have being discussed in guess and ambiguity 
(Vanderwolf, 2007). 
 Nowadays, however, an obvious trend in economics is the emphasis on cognition element of an 
individual and its influences on behavior (i.e., Masahiko Aoki, 2001; D. C. North, 2003, 2005;   
V. L. Smith, 2003; ect.). These weaken the rational assumption held by main stream economics 
and struggle make efforts to grasp the truth of individual behaviors and cognitive changes. 
 Along the above-mentioned developmental path, under the real uncertain environment, how 
should we properly set individual behavior as a premise, and explain individual knowledge change 
and formation or evolution of common behavioral rules within behavioral interactions, so as to 
avoid simply induction or abstractly deduction from phenomena, even if with no perfect 
mathematic formalization initially? In order to do this, we might need to surpass the original 
economic boundary and go farther along the naturally evolutionary road of human beings. 
 Following the thought of "falsifying a theory" (K.P. Popper, 1963) and building on testable 
findings from empirical disciplines, such as cognitive neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, 
animal behavior study, and so on, the paper tries to exposit general conditions of individual 
behavior, formation of individual knowledge in behavioral process, and the change mechanism of 
common behavioral rules ( i.e., shared knowledge) among individuals in the behavior interacting 
process. The structure of this paper is as follows: based on empirical materials, three different 
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basic assumptions and one simplified framework on individual behavior are offered in the second 
part; in the third part, individual knowledge change, and formation and change mechanics of 
shared knowledge among individuals are explained respectively; finally, the conclusion of the 
paper is provided and related questions are discussed in the fourth part. 
2. Basic Assumptions and a Simplified Framework of Individual Behavior 
2.1 Basic Assumption 1: Hierarchical Preference 
 In the process of natural selection dealing with uncertain environments, human beings form 
stable behavioral tropisms or propensities internalized in their genes (K.Z.Lorenz, 1981; 
D.Morris,1970; E.O.Wilson, 2000; etc.), which might mainly include propensities of energy 
ingestion, sex, exploring(or novelty-seeking), etc1. 
 In human economic-social activities, however, those behavioral tendencies or interests (e.g., G. S. 
Becker, 1976), varying with different circumstances or individuals, are not innate, but are acquired 
by experiencing uncertain environments and by behavioral learning of trying or imitating; so they 
are changeable and can be different from each other.  
 Mainstream neoclassical economics usually uses one conception "preference" to characterize 
behavioral tendency, but does not distinguish the naturally evolutionary ones from the others 
formed by acquisition. So in its description or analysis of individual behavior, there always exists 
deviation from reality. 
 It is necessary to divide preference into at last two hierarchies - the inner and the outer. Derived 
from the process of natural evolution, the former is stable and keeps the same among human 
beings (if neglecting the difference on food-taking among Inuit lived in the Arctic regions and 
other humans); based on this biological foundation, individuals undergo their environments and 
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form their mutable outer-hierarchy preferences, as shown by the Figure-1. 
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 From the viewpoint of modern neurobiology (J. G. Nicholls, et al., 2001; V. K. Jirsa and A. R. 
McIntosh, 2007; ect), behavioral propensity of an individual can be considered as connections of 
different signals between neurons. So, the inner-hierarchy preference is the stable and common 
neuronal connection in all human beings. By contrast, the outer-hierarchy preference is the 
acquired neuronal connection, and is alterable or adjustable. 
 Therefore, we get the Assumption 1 - hierarchical preference: Preference can be divided at least 
into the stable inner-hierarchy and the mutable outer-hierarchy one. 
2.2 Basic Assumption 2: Learning Capacity 
 After experiencing their environments, why can human beings acquire outer-hierarchy 
preferences (i.e., form certain neuronal connections)? The key reason dose not lie in learning 
behavior itself, but in the capacity which make the former possible. When discussing human 
aggression, E.O.Wilson (2000, p.255) indicated, "We are now sophisticated enough to know that 
the capacity to learn certain behaviors is itself a genetically controlled and therefore evolved trait." 
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M.D.Hauser and E.Spelke (2004) showed that the foundations of human acquiring skills are a set 
of psychological and neural mechanisms, which are shared by all individuals. 
 That is to say, from the viewpoint of behavioral performance, an individual deals with various 
(repeated or new) signals from outside environments, undertakes behavioral learning and acquires 
outer-hierarchy preferences. The capacity itself, however, forming neuronal connections and 
making learning possible, derives from the process of human natural evolution, and is stable and 
the same for everyone.  
 Empirical disciplines have discovered some types of capacity, for examples, capacity of 
(chemical or social) signal recognizing (S.Hao et al., 2005; P. H.Rudebeck et al., 2006), capacity 
of (anticipatory or generalizing) signal operating (W.Schultz et al., 1997; J.W.Brown and 
T.S.Braver, 2005; N.P.Rougier et al., 2005), capacity of dynamic switching between signal 
connections (C.K.Machens et al., 2005; K.R.Ridderinkhof and W.P.Wildenberg, 2005), ect. 
 Before economics analyzes and explains individual behavior, it is necessary to understand and 
differentiate between learning capacity and learning. The former is the unlearned biological 
foundation on which signal connections can be formed among neurons. It is to the same for every 
individual. But learning is a behavioral process in which an individual forms signal connections. 
Please see the Figure-2.  
 Therefore, there is the Assumption 2 - learning capacity: It is unlearned and to the same for 
everyone, by which an individual performs learning behavior. 
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Figure-2  Learning Capacity and Learning Behavior
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2.3 Basic Assumption 3: Evaluation-feedback Mechanism 
 How do human beings process environmental signals when possessing hierarchical preference 
and learning capacity? 
 Empirical findings reveal that there exist some types of signal processing mechanisms in human 
beings. According to functional differences, these mechanisms possibly can be divided into three 
types : firstly, the most stable mechanisms, such as reflex in early behavior studies 
(I.P.Pavlov,1927); secondly, more stable mechanisms, mainly including most neural response 
systems derived from natural evolution except reflex2; thirdly, mutable mechanisms, formed in 
individual experiences. The first two are likely evolved from the process of natural evolution 
together with inner-hierarchy preference and learning capacity, and cannot be consciously 
perceived by human beings; the last one, however, under the regulation of the first two and 
directly based on the outer-hierarchy preference, can be consciously used and be adjusted with 
acquired preferences by individuals. 
 Here we refer the above-mentioned three types as evaluation-feedback mechanism, in which an 
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individual compares received environmental signals with all hierarchical preferences. If signals 
are identical with those preferences, “quasi-reward” evaluation will be produced, and the related 
signal connections can be formed and accumulated in individual’s learning process or 
outer-hierarchy preferences. On the contrary, “quasi-punishment” evaluation will be produced, and 
the related connections will be formed in the similar way.  
 So there is the Assumption 3 - evaluation-feedback mechanism: On the basis of assumption 1 and 
2, an individual has an evaluation-feedback mechanism to process outside environmental signals. 
2.4 One Simplified Framework of Individual Behavior  
 Synthesizing the above-mentioned three assumptions, we offer a simplified framework of 
individual behavior when dealing with outside environmental signals, shown in the Figure -3. 
 Inner-hierarchy preference and learning capacity constitute the most stable level of individual 
behavior; based on it, an individual evaluates environmental signals, and gradually acquires 
perceivable and alterable outer-hierarchy preferences with different stability through experiences; 
together with learning capacity, inner and outer-hierarchy preference, he or she makes behavior 
when facing those signals. Especially, when dealing with repeated signals, he or she shows 
repetitious behavior mode (such as behavioral habits, customs, etc.); after his or her behavior acts 
on outside environment, he or she anticipates or receives relevant feedback signals. Through 
evaluation-feedback mechanism's processing again, he or she may maintain original behavior (or 
behavioral mode), or adjust it (such as changing one’s habits, customs). Please see the Figure-3. 
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 It needs to be noticed that, first, the most stable inner-hierarchy preference engages in the process 
of evaluating and feeding back signals all the time; but, usually, it can not be perceived by human 
beings. So in the Figure-3, it is denoted by an arrow with the broken line. Second, results from 
evaluation-feedback mechanism cannot be accumulated in inner-hierarchy preference and learning 
capacity, but can do so in outer-hierarchy preferences. This is because, as discussed previous, 
inner-hierarchy preference and learning capacity, derived from the natural evolution process, are 
relatively stable. In the recent million years since the agricultural revolution, human behavior 
modes and social structures have changed vastly. From the viewpoint of natural evolution, 
however, the time is too short to select for new complex cognitive programs (L.Cosmides and 
J.Tooby, 2006). Therefore, the paper treats inner-hierarchy preference and learning capacity as 
unalterable ones. 
3. Hierarchy and Change of Knowledge  
 As discussed above, preference is of hierarchic, including both evolved stable connection among 
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signals (inner-hierarchy preference) and acquired alterable connection from experience 
(outer-hierarchy preference); learning is a behavioral process forming and building certain 
connections among signals; what makes learning possible is the stable learning capacity evolved 
from natural evolution (capacity of forming connections); from the perspective of final outcome of 
behavior, after being evaluated and fed back, acquired connection is gradually accumulated in 
outside of inner-hierarchy preference which always influences on the former. 
 The above-mentioned concepts are set forth on the basis of signal connection. F.A.Hayek (1952) 
thought that the entire human mental structure or knowledge derives from the connections 
between neurons and their signals. Based on this idea and other empirical findings, we think that 
individual knowledge is a connection between one event (or a signal) and another. Accordingly, 
accumulation of knowledge is storage of the connections. 
 Given the behavioral assumptions and the above-mentioned framework, in real circumstances, 
what state of knowledge does an individual have? How does individual behavior interact with 
knowledge gaining, changing, and accumulation? How does behavioral interaction bring about 
shared knowledge (or common behavioral rules) among individuals, such as conventions or 
customs?  
3.1 Hierarchy and Change of individual knowledge 
 As we defined above, knowledge is a connection. And there are both the stable and the acquired 
in connections. Correspondingly, knowledge can be divided into inner-hierarchic (or connatural) 
and outer-hierarchic (or acquired) one. Mainly relating to the stability of preference, the stability 
of knowledge is gradually weakened from the inner to the outer: the more stable preference is, the 
more stable knowledge is; the more alterable preference is, the more unstable knowledge is. 
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Connatural knowledge is most stable and is called inner-hierarchy one. Acquired knowledge (i.e., 
connections learned from experiences) is in out-hierarchy. Knowledge in a different hierarchy has 
a different degree of stability. Please see the Figure-4. 
 
 
Figure-4  Hierarchical Knowledge 
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 The first hierarchy: connatural knowledge. It includes inner-hierarchy preference and leaning 
capacity determined by genes, and is shared by all human beings. It is still steady and unalterable 
in social communication, which constitutes the fundamental prerequisite for mutually recognizing 
signals (or events) and interactions among individuals.  
 The second hierarchy: acquired knowledge. Besides the connatural knowledge, an individual 
owns acquired knowledge from experiences. This part of knowledge can be changed or adjusted 
and is different for different individuals3. 
 Generally speaking, the source or change of acquired knowledge comes from new signals. The 
acquisition mode of the knowledge is direct trial and error or imitation. One situation is that facing 
a new signal, through the existing accumulated preference, an individual evaluates and feeds back 
it and its resulting signal. After the new signal repeats several times, by means of evaluation of the 
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original preference, he (or she) establishes a new connection between the new signal and its 
resulting signal. In this situation, he (or she) acquires new knowledge, but the original preference 
is not changed. There are many such things. For example, after a change of technology, an 
individual gets help from it to reinforce his or her original preference and improve the efficiency 
of his or her original act. 
 Another situation is that a new signal changes the original preference and forms new preference 
and knowledge. That is, when encountering a new signal a and its resulting signal a', an individual 
reevaluates original preference p1; after a and a' repeat several times, they may increasingly 
change p1 , and form a new preference p′1 and related new knowledge. There are many such 
examples . For instance, after successfully having abandoned bow and arrow and used rifles 
twenty five years, facing massive slaughters, Maori in New Zealand started to question their 
centuries-old fighting preference. Then after a short time, the original preference was 
fundamentally changed, and all Maori were converted to Christianity and completely stopped their 
tribe wars (E.O.Wilson, 1978). 
 As discussed above, connatural knowledge of individuals is a common trait from human natural 
evolution and a fundamental precondition of interaction, which therefore can be called 
connatural-shared-knowledge among individuals. Although not exactly the same in acquired 
knowledge among individuals, there still exists partially common or similar acquired knowledge 
from common or similar experiences, which we call acquired-shared-knowledge. As far as the 
signal connecting feature of acquired-shared-knowledge is concerned, the knowledge is the 
common anticipation owned among individuals about behavioral response of other individuals 
facing a signal. 
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 Here the connatural-shared-knowledge will not be discussed, but the emphasis is mainly put on 
acquired-shared-knowledge.  
 Source or change of acquired-shared-knowledge still originates in a new signal which can be 
received among individuals. Generally speaking, the signal may mainly come from change of 
individual environment (such as migration, ubiquitous uncertainty in economic systems, etc.), or 
from another's new behavior. When a new signal occurring, it breaks the stability of original 
behavior anticipation. Hereafter, along with learning and interaction, common behavior 
anticipation about the new signal, i.e., new acquired-shared-knowledge, will be increasingly 
formed among individuals. Please see the Figure-5. 
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Figure-5  Interaction and Shared Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 There are two key points in the Figure-5:  
 The first is formation of acquired-shared-knowledge in the interaction between individuals and 
circumstances. When a new circumstance signal is simultaneously recognized by individual i and j, 
they observe each other’s behavioral response. With the signal repeating, they can gradually 
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facilitate the previous observation and estimation about each other’s behavioral response to 
change into common behavior anticipation about the same content. The process can be enlarged 
among n individuals and thus shared knowledge can be formed among them. 
 The second is formation of acquired-shared-knowledge in the interaction among individuals. 
Under a common circumstance, when individual i sends a behavior signal ai to individual j, j gives 
off behavior response aj by evaluating and feeding back ai. If the connection ai-aj between ai and aj 
does not comply with i’s anticipation, i will possibly adjust his (or her) behavior and again send 
out behavior signal a′i according to his (or her) preexisting knowledge. If the connection a′i-aj 
between a'i and aj still does not comply with j’s anticipation, it may subsequently induce an 
adjusting behavior a′j from j, ……, and so forth. Through observation, try-and-error, or imitation 
within a certain period, shared knowledge between i and j will be ultimately formed. The 
interaction between i and j may serve as a new signal to individual k. In the same manner, shared 
knowledge about a same behavior signal will be formed among i, j, k, ......, n individuals. So 
according to this viewpoint, formation and possession of relatively stable shared knowledge only 
can provide firmly shared beliefs and behavioral rules for every individual's behavior anticipation 
and their interaction within a group. Acquired-shared-knowledge is the core of group's behavior 
convention, custom, or institutional rule. 
4.Conclusion and Discussion  
 Based on evidences from empirical disciplines, the paper offers three different basic assumptions 
on individual behavior - hierarchical preference, learning capacity and evaluation-feedback 
mechanism, and one simplified behavioral framework when an individual dealing with outside 
environmental signals. On the basis of these, we think that individual knowledge is a connection 
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between one event (or signal) and another, accumulation of knowledge is storage of the 
connections, and point out the hierarchical state of individual knowledge - unalterably connatural 
knowledge in inner-hierarchy and changeably acquired knowledge in outer-hierarchy and, the 
connatural- and the acquired-shared-knowledge among individuals. Furthermore, the paper 
describes and explains the sources and general mechanisms of changing of these kinds of 
knowledge, and stresses that human connatural knowledge, from the natural evolution, is all the 
same and independent of individual experience, region or culture; it is the most stable level in the 
entire knowledge of human beings, which constitutes the fundamental prerequisite for mutually 
recognizing signals (or events) and interactions among individuals; the 
acquired-shared-knowledge, however, on the part of the signal connecting feature of knowledge, is 
the common anticipation owned among individuals about behavioral response of other individuals 
facing a signal; it derives from interacting experiences between individuals and circumstances or 
among individuals; and with its accumulation, the stable anticipation of individual behavior, 
commonly behavioral beliefs and rules will can be formed in a group. 
 The paper thinks the three aspects as following are important and should be discussed further: 
4.1 Connatural Knowledge, Individual Rationality and Neoclassical Economics  
 Although not perfect, the shared connatural knowledge from the natural evolution is a 
fundamental precondition based on which human beings can interact with each other and obtain 
acquired knowledge from their experiences. Rationality is one of imperfect items included in the 
connatural knowledge, just by which human ancestors can never resolve evolutionary adaptive 
problems repeatedly encountered (L.Cosmides and J.Tooby,1994). From the viewpoints of 
hierarchy of preference and knowledge in the paper, the behavioral analysis of neoclassical 
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economics based on the rational assumption is better adaptive to the domain of inner-hierarchy 
preference and knowledge, not to the domain of outer-hierarchy because of its mutability and 
difference from everyone. From the basic state of human beings reveled by empirical disciplines 
and uncertain environment faced all along by people, as D.C.North (2005) pointed out, 
neoclassical economics is not good enough to explain or analyze changes in human behavior and 
knowledge.  
4.2 Individual Experience and Knowledge Acquisition  
 Based on shared inner-hierarchy preference and learning capacity and through experiencing, an 
individual acquires outer-hierarchy knowledge under his (or her) environment. Especially under 
the condition of repeated environmental signal in the long run, certain steadier behavior propensity 
can be accumulated in outer-hierarchy preference, which further forms some steady mode of 
knowledge acquisition and therefore influences individual behavior significantly so that different 
people undertake different behaviors.  
 On the other hand, differences in individual experiences and their continuity or intensity lead to 
the differences in stability in outer-hierarchy preference or knowledge, which bring about the 
differences in degree of individual behavior adjustment under the same condition of information 
when environments change (such as migrating), and so as to present the phenomena that some 
people can learn but others learn slowly or even never able to learn under a new environment. 
Therefore, individual experiences play an important role between human biological substrate and 
realistic behavior (P.Stern and P. J.Hines, 2005). 
4.3 Shared Knowledge and Common behavior Rule within a Group 
 On the biological level, human beings share nondistinctive connatural knowledge from the nature 
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evolution. Because of partial similarity in their experiences, individuals can share some acquired 
knowledge accumulated in the outer-hierarchy. The acquired-shared-knowledge is still one of 
important conditions of smoothly communicating and forming common behavior rules, such as 
convention, custom, etc., among individuals within a group. But in fact, because of the different 
stability of the original preference or knowledge acquired by individuals, especially under the 
strong influences of factors, such as religion, country, and political coercion so on, the birth of the 
knowledge within a group is not easy. That is, under the above-mentioned conditions, when 
different individuals are encountering or communicating in the same environment, it is difficult to 
form shared knowledge and conform to common behavior rules among individuals, which may be 
dependent on individuals' interaction in a long period, and on common signals of environment and 
behavior being repeated or reinforced continuously with no or least intentional interference. For 
example, as showed and predicted in A.Alesina and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), it will take 
about one to two generations for East German's some preferences and beliefs to converge 
completely towards those of West Germans from 1990 reunification then on. Therefore, it will be 
significantly meaningful to observe and record those kinds of real materials, and offer authentic 
interpretation and analysis of formation and change of shared knowledge or common behavior 
rule among individuals. 
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Notes 
1. Other possible types of congenital propensities, such as obedience (S.Milgram, 1963), ritualized 
behavior (P. Boyer, 2006), and so forth, are also researched. 
2. For instances, neural networks in the brain involving reward-evaluation (S.M.McClure et al., 
2004); anticipatory evaluation of the brain to some cognitive information and relevant behavior 
regulating (N.Camille et al., 2004); and social evaluation mechanism in preverbal infant brain 
towards other individual’s actions and intentions (J.K.Hamlin et al., 2007). Additionally, emotion 
systems play an important role when coping with risky and uncertain choices (M.Hsu et al., 2005). 
L.Cosmides and J.Tooby (2006) believed that some of human morality or emotions are evolved 
from the process of natural selection, which work so naturally that their operation is unnoticed, 
and disappears into the background, or is taken for granted. 
3. Acquired knowledge can be further differentiated to many types, such as tacit knowledge 
(M.Polanyi, 1983), explicit knowledge described by symbols, ect. But here the paper only talks 
over general conditions of acquired knowledge. 
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